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Abstract
Hitherto, forty-one national referendums have been conducted on European integration in
over twenty countries. While it is clear that this process has not led to a widely shared
common identity, this paper explores the hypothesis that national referendums on European
issues do in fact contribute to the emergence of a European identity. I will propose three
mechanisms by which this is likely to happen. Firstly, although referendums and especially
the debate preceding them may sharpen the divide between Europhiles and Euroskeptics,
they bear the potential to bring into the public sphere awareness of European issues and
therefore to spark a learning process. Secondly, the debates triggered by referendums give
rise to the emergence of a European public sphere, even in member-states which do not
conduct referendums. Thirdly, they can contribute to narrowing the gap between political
elites and ordinary citizens, thereby reducing the democratic deficit.
In addition to the burgeoning literature on the topic, which however focuses on the
relationship between referendums and support for European integration, Eurobarometers
provide substantive and quantitative data on the issues –namely European referendums and
identities– raised in this paper. The study will focus on the twenty-seven referendums of the
post-Treaty of Maastricht era. The discussion of the concept of European identity opens the
essay. In the following sections, I present briefly the political and historical context in regard
to referendums upon which I attempt to demonstrate the three specific mechanisms
(learning process, European public sphere, and reduction of the democratic deficit) in the
emergence of a European identity, using Eurobarometers data which show the evolution of
national and European identification before and after the organization of the referendums.
The conclusion discusses the findings and explores other elements that matter in
constructing a European identity.
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Appendix 1: Support to country’s membership to the European Community/Union:
1973-2004.
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Appendix 2: National identity and European identity: 1992-2004.
REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION 1
On June 1, 2005, three days after the French Non, 2  a majority of Dutch (61.6%)
rejected the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. A month later, Luxembourg held
a referendum 3  on the same subject. The “Yes” won with 56.5% of the votes. In contrast
to her neighbors, Belgium ratified the constitutional treaty without popular consultation. In
both Luxembourg and The Netherlands, holding a referendum on a European treaty
constituted a new experience; hitherto, Belgium has never held a popular consultation on a
European issue. Since the beginning of the European integration in the 1950’s, the
population of these three founding members has usually strongly supported the European
enterprise. While it is clear that the fifty years long process of Europeanization has not led
to a widely shared common identity, this paper explores the hypothesis that national
referendums on European issues do in fact contribute to the emergence of a European
identity. Using John Stuart Mill’s method of agreement and method of difference (Mill
1843/2002), I shall compare the cases of Belgium, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands;
whereas the former is not likely to hold any European referendums in the near future (for
historical and political reasons), the latter two have recently consulted their population for
the first time but with an opposite outcome. 4
My argument is threefold. First, although referendums may sharpen the divide between
Europhiles and Euroskeptics, they bear the potential to bring into the public sphere
awareness of European issues and therefore to spark discussions about them (a learning
process), regardless of the outcomes. This learning process can foster the development of
a European identity. Second, in addition to this process, the debates triggered by
referendums resound in a European public sphere across the countries, even in
member-states which do not conduct a consultation on the issue. Third, they can
contribute to narrow the gap between political elites and ordinary citizens; thereby
European integration could resonate more among European populations –facilitating
citizens’ identification with the process. Above all, the construction of a collective identity,
in this case European, is a complex matter where popular consultations can be a useful
tool –but not a necessary one, as the case of Belgium will show– along with other forms of
participation (civil and political associations as well as EU-wide referendums).
Nonetheless, a paradox lies at the heart of European direct democracy: while referendums
can contribute to the emergence of a European identity, Europeans can ultimately reject
the process with which they start to identify.
This paper is primarily based on two sources. On the one hand, the growing literature
–combining quantitative and qualitative research– on the subject, which focuses on the
relationship between referendums and support for European integration, gives us the
theoretical and empirical framework. On the other hand, this paper is based on the
analysis of Eurobarometers, qualitative studies, and other European surveys prepared
principally by the European Commission. Both sources have provided substantive and
quantitative data on the issues –namely European referendums and identities– raised in
this paper. The discussion of the concept of European identity opens the essay. In this
section, I argue that a common European identity, or better European spirit, will differ
widely from the existing national identities and above all, will not exclude but rather
complement the latter. In the following sections, I present briefly the political and historical
context in regard to popular consultations in the three case studies upon which I attempt to
answer the question whether referendum can be a tool for building a European identity.
The conclusion discusses the findings and explores other forms of participation that
facilitate the emergence of a European identity.
EUROPEAN IDENTITY – EUROPEAN SPIRIT
Notwithstanding fifty years of tremendous achievements in many aspects of the European
political, economic, social, and environmental life, the European Union (EU) has not a
common identity. This état de fait raises the question whether the EU can have a common
identity. The European Treaties proclaim both “an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe” (art. 1, Treaty on European Union) and the Union’s respect for “the national
identities of its Member States” (art. 6§3, Treaty on European Union). Above all, since
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1992, “every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the
Union.” But “citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national
citizenship.” This European citizenship confers several rights: among others, to move,
reside, vote, to enjoy diplomatic protection, to petition (Part Two, Treaty establishing the
European Community). Nonetheless, Eurobarometers as well as the low-out for European
elections show, on the one hand, a strong national identity amongst every people of
Europe and, on the other hand, little evidence of a European common identity (see
Appendix 1 and 2).
Collective identity is made of both a self-definition and a sense of belonging. Social groups
share “a set of ideas to which members can relate positively” (Marcusen et alii 1999: 615);
thereby, on the basis of this set of ideas, which shapes a common worldview, the
members of the groups form an “imagined communities.” 5  Next to the sense of
belonging, the identity of a group is also shaped by its self-definition: who are we and who
is/are “the other(s).” Thus, a collective identity finds its roots in several aspects of the
group’s life: culture and history, symbols, leadership, public policies, education, among
others. These various facets contribute to the construction of a common identity.
Moreover, and especially important in the discussion of a common identity for the E.U.,
“individuals are members of several social groups, which may or may not overlap. In other
words, they hold multiple identities” (Marcusen et alii 1999: 616, emphasis in the original).
Indeed, in some segments of the European population, a European identity complements
national identities: certainly amongst E.U. civil servants and leaders, increasingly amongst
students. The personnel of the Commission sensu lato, mainly based in Brussels, is
uniquely characterized by “its own ethos and a strong esprit de corps” (Shore 2000:127).
In fact, E.U. fonctionnaires share a European common identity; i.e. the pursuit of the same
European interest and ideal as well as a common tongue (a Euro-speak made of jargon,
acronyms, and a mix of French and English). Similarly, though to a lesser extent,
European leaders show a common identity. Thus, there is an increasing gulf between
those who share a common identity and those who don’t. To be sure, “changing minds on
questions of identity is no a small task” (Savage 2004: 45).
In the context of the European integration, the neo-functionalist approach suggests that
eventually doing (i.e. functions) leads to being (i.e. identity): one function creates the need
for another function in a different area by way of spill over and finally, theses functions will
engender a European identity because they have an increasingly direct effect on
European’s lives (see, e.g., Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz
1998). 6  In contrast to the neo-functionalist perspective, the supranational approach
contends that the integration of the economies and markets as well as the policies will lead
to a common identity. A striking example is the principle of mutual recognition by which
any product that meets the country of production’s standards can be sold in any other
countries (see, e.g., Cassis de Dijon 1979).
These lines of arguments lead to the conclusion that there is a relationship between
someone’s support for European integration (or the membership of his country in the EU)
and his European identity. Thomas Risse shows that the stronger an individual’s European
identity, the greater his support for the EU (2002). Using three alternative
conceptualizations of national identity, Sean Carey reaches a similar conclusion (2002).
Therefore, at the core of a European identity lies the support for European integration.
However, the two concepts do not match completely. On the one hand, an individual can
be supportive of the European integration but without having a European identity. For
instance, the reason for his support might rest only on economic factors –this is the
political economy theory for explaining support for European integration (see, e.g., Carey
2002; McLaren 2002). On the other hand, an individual could hold a European identity but
not be supportive of the actual direction of the European integration. Rather, he might
support, as Jacques Derrida puts it, “une autre Europe, une Europe plus sociale et moins
marchande” (2004).
Finally, “new visions of political order need to resonate with pre-existing collective identities
embedded in political institutions and cultures in order to constitute a legitimate political
discourse” (Marcusen et alii 1999: 615, emphasis in the original). Chiefly, a european
identity is not mutually exclusive to national identities, rather it complements (and
resonates with) national identities. The E.U. should not be seen as a super state where all
identities and states will be subsumed for the European good. On the contrary, the states
are the raison d’être of the Union. As such, it respects and even promotes cultural and
linguistic diversity. 7  So, in addition to a national identity (and sometimes a regional
identity), Europeans could hold a European identity, which could be better called a
European spirit (“esprit européen”) in order to stress the difference with national identity.
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This spirit would reflect the pursuit of a common European well-being (economic,
environment, education-wise). This European spirit mixes both cosmopolitanism and
multiculturalism. European spirit combines the cultural diversity defended by
multiculturalists with a directly understandable lingua franca promoted by cosmopolitans. 8
This said, in the rest of the paper, I analyze how national referendums can foster the
emergence of such a European spirit (a combination of both national and European
identification) in the case of Belgium, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands.
EUROPEAN REFERENDUMS. TO REFERENDUM OR NOT TO REFERENDUM
Apart from Switzerland, European countries do not frequently include their citizens in the
law- and decision-making process. However, since the 1970’s, referendums on the
European integration have occurred in several member and non-member states. Three
different types of referendums can be distinguished: accession referendums, 9
treaty-ratification referendums, 10  and European issues related referendums. 11
Forty-one referendums have been conducted on European issues in almost twenty
countries. 12  Nonetheless, since the origin of the European construction, no referendum
has ever been organized in Belgium; Luxembourg and The Netherlands had their first
European referendum this year. Before exploring the use of referendums as a tool for
building a European identity in these three countries, the next section presents their
respective political and historical context in relation with referendums.
Belgium
Since the popular consultation on the Question Royale in March 1950, when a majority of
Dutch-speaking Belgians voted for the return of King Leopold III but a majority of
French-speaking Belgians opposed it, Belgians in general and Belgian politicians in
particular have feared direct democracy. Indeed, the consultation was followed by serious
riots and civil war was only avoided because of the abdication of the King (see, e.g.,
Dumont 1993; Luykx and Platel 1985; Mabille 2000; Wils 1996; Witte and Craeybeckx
1987). Foremost, the Constitution proclaims that “all powers emanate from the Nation and
are exerted in the manner established by the Constitution” (art. 33 Const.); in short, in
Belgium, the principle of representation does not allow direct democracy, i.e. the
organization of referendums. In this regard, the non-binding 1950 referendum was referred
as a –popular– consultation. Moreover, citizens are also excluded form the
treaty-ratification process where the normal parliamentary procedure applies (art. 53 and
167 Const.). Hence, Belgians have never been consulted on the question of the European
integration.
However, the fear of direct democracy has gradually diminished –the ever-present
internecine linguistic conflict notwithstanding– partly because of the growing number of
referendums organized throughout the world (Butler and Ranney 1994), partly because of
the increasing gap between political leaders and citizens –to which referendums are
considered to be a solution (Rigo 2004). 13  In the last decade, many propositions and
arguments have flourished for more civic participation in the res publica via the
organization of consultative referendums. Nonetheless, despite the new possibilities to
hold local and provincial consultations, 14  no consensus has hitherto been reached at
the national level and it seems that both political and constitutional factors might hinder the
use of direct democracy instruments in Belgium.
Thus, although Belgians show a high support for European integration in general, and for
the European Constitution in particular, they have not been given the chance to state it
through a formal procedure. 15  Noteworthy, despite the absence of a referendum,
echoing the constitutional debate in both France and The Netherlands, the media as well
as the politicians discussed the topic of the European Constitution. Eventually, a large
majority in every of the six parliaments ratified the proposed text. 16
Luxembourg
Similar to Belgium, Luxembourg held its first referendum on a royal question. In 1919,
Luxembourgers were asked whether they wished to live in a Republic or in a Monarchy;
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the latter was chosen by more than 80% of the voters. The second and third referendums
were organized on socio-economic issues during the inter-war period. Since then,
instruments of direct democracy had not been employed in the Grand Duchy on national
issues, let alone on European ones.
In his 2003 state-of-the-nation speech, Prime Minister Claude Juncker announced a
referendum on the European Constitution stressing the importance of the issue (Juncker
2003). Moreover, even though only consultative referendums may be organized, he stated
that the choice of the citizens would be respected –while, however, he pledged to resign
should the treaty be rejected (Glesener 2005). On July 10, 2005, following six months of
rotating presidency and a few weeks after the French and Dutch “No,” Luxembourgers
went to the polling booths and a majority of them endorsed the constitutional text
(56.5%), 17  which was formally ratified by the parliament two weeks later.
Indeed, the victory of the “Yes” camp was more difficult than expected, especially knowing
Luxembourg’s exceptional Europhilia with 82% of her citizens in favor of being a member
of the EU (Eurobarometer 64, Luxembourg, 2005: 3; and Eurobarometer 173,
“Post-Referendum in Luxembourg” 2005). The campaign both produced one of the most
heated debates about Europeans politics to date and revealed the existence of a
discrepancy between the attitude toward Europe among the elites and the general public
(Hausemer 2005). This said, the heat of the campaign was also a consequence of the
French and Dutch “No.” Finally, the campaign and the results of the referendum illustrate
the evaporation of the “permissive consensus” (Inglehart 1977) which dominated the
European (non-)debate until then in Luxembourg.
The Netherlands
The experience of direct democracy via a referendum constituted a unique event in Dutch
modern history. The Netherlands was the only European countries which never held a
nationwide referendum (Rigo 2005: 2). The Dutch constitution organizes a political system
chiefly based on the principle of representation (art. 50 and art. 67 Const.), even in the
case of the transfer of sovereignty towards international institutions (art. 91 and 92 Const.).
However, proponents and opponents of direct democracy have argued for the last
century. 18  Since the 1990’s, bills introducing the possibility of referendums have been
discussed at the national, provincial, and communal levels. Finally, a specific authorization
to consult the population over the European constitution was passed by the House in
October 2004 and by the Senate in January 2005.
On June 1, 2005, the Netherlands organized her first nationwide referendum, which was
non-binding (i.e. consultative) and non-compulsory. Almost two-thirds of Dutch electors
participated in the consultation; 61.6% of them rejected the constitutional treaty
(Eurobarometer 172, “Post-Referendum in The Netherlands” 2005). Although the Dutch
have usually strongly supported the European integration (see appendix 1), the victory of
the “No” was not unexpected. Both national and European factors seem to explain the
result of the referendum.
On the one hand, for the last decade, a widespread disenchantment with the political
establishment has haunted the Dutch polity. This disenchantment was notably illustrated
by the capture of 17% of the votes in the 2002 national elections by the List Pim Fortyun
–despite the absence of the Pim Fortuyn himself. Moreover, since all main parties
campaigned for the “Ja,” voting “Nee” was an occasion to protest against the political
establishment (Crum 2005) as well as to manifest one’s concern about issues of identity
(for instance, immigration). On the other hand, the Dutch public perceived the process of
Europeanization as “a blind train which is running far too fast” (Cuperus 2005: 1). Above
all, the rejection of the European constitution indicated, like in Luxembourg, the end of the
“permissive consensus” over the European enterprise and the ever-increasing gulf
between the political elites and the citizens.
How can referendums contribute to the emergence of a European identity in these three
countries is the interrogation that the rest of the paper attempts to answer.
REFERENDUMS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The first national referendum on European integration was held in France in 1972, since
then, as mentioned above, forty-one referendums have been conducted on European
issues in almost twenty countries. I briefly present the burgeoning literature on this subject
in order to inform the study of the relationship between referendums and European
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identity.
The Voters
Since the 1970’s, an increasing amount of scholarship has addressed the question of how
voters decide in European referendums. Two competing approaches have endeavored to
explain voting behavior. On the one hand, the “attitude” school “focuses on individuals’
values and beliefs and argues that voting in EU referendums reflects people’s underlying,
broad attitudes towards European integration” (Hobolt 2006: 155; see, e.g., Siune et alii
1994 or Svenson 2002). Thus, voting in a referendum is similar to voting in an ordinary
election and voters make reasoned decisions about the future of the EU. On the other
hand, inspired by the second-order theory of elections, the alternative school maintains
that “national issues tend to dominate the campaigns and voters are thus expected to use
their vote as a means of signaling their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the government
or to follow the recommendations of national parties” (Hobolt 2006: 155; see, e.g., Franklin
et alii 1994). Hence, the outcomes of referendums constitute either plebiscites or
punishments for the performance of national governments.
Chiefly, the explanation for voting behavior lies probably in-between, varying from one
referendum to the other, as well as from one voter to the other. In other words, it is a
question whether voters “really address the issues and involve themselves actively in the
policy-making process in a vital issue or do they merely vote for or against the current
government” (Svenson 2002: 733). Noteworthy, both Franklin (2002) and Hobolt (2005)
suggest that when voters have a great knowledge of European affairs, they are less likely
to treat the referendum as a second-order election. 19
The Political Elites
The chief characteristic of referendums is the participation of the electorate in
policy-making. However, the role of the political elites should not be minimized. Indeed,
very few referendums are required by law; 20  most of them are “the product of strategic
elites considerations” (Hobolt 2006: 157). Morel presents different reasons why
governments have initiated referendums: certainty of success, solution to an
intra-government, intra-party or broader political disagreement, and de facto obligatory
referendums (2001). Yet, when the process is launched, “referenda increase the salience
of European issues and, perhaps more importantly, limit the capacity of political parties
and their leaderships to control debate. Unlike general elections, referenda highlight
conflicts within, as well as among political parties” (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 7-8).
Whereas general elections see political parties (controlled by the political elites) seek to
win the right to govern, referendums, in contrast, constitute unrestrained expressions and
therefore can spin out of the elite control (Leduc 2001). Thus, the relationship between
support for European integration and national identity should vary between the countries
which have experienced referendums on European issues and those which have not.
Moreover, both Dutch and Luxembourgish referendums have signaled the end of the
permissive consensus on European integration; i.e. the citizens desire to have a say in the
direction and the speed of the European process. It is also a call for the reduction of the
gap between political elites and ordinary citizens. Finally, and chiefly, discourses and
values do matter. In the context of the reform of the welfare state, Vivien Schmidt stresses
the role of values and legitimizing discourses in policy change (2000). Her emphasis on
political discourse can be aptly applied in the context of referendums on European
integration. During the campaign, Dutch political leaders from mainstream parties did not
address the content of the Constitution, rather they urged the voters to be reasonable as
“voting no was considered to be dangerous and stupid” (Cupérus 2005: 5). In
Luxembourg, the highly popular Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, a cheerful supporter
of the European Constitution, threatened to resign, should the citizens reject the
constitutional text. Yet, a survey showed that 45% of the respondents thought that the
Prime Minister’s attitude amounted to “blackmailing voters.” 21  In both cases, political
discourses did not resonate much among Dutch and Luxembourgese populations.
Therefore, it seems clear that, in future referendum campaigns, should political leaders fail
to offer an appropriate discourse or worse use an arrogant tone, the electorate would
inevitably use the poll to sanction them rather than position itself on the issue at stake.
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Support for European integration: national identity and 
referendums.
Relying on the large-scale quasi-experiment of European integration, Christin and Hug test
whether referendums lead to more supportive voters with data covering more than 20
years. They find suggestive evidence that referendums lead to citizens’ being more
supportive of European integration. Moreover, similarly to Eichenberg and Dalton (1993),
their results suggest that voters more strongly support European integration immediately
after a referendum vote, on average by more than 4% (Christin and Hug 2002). However,
some caution is necessary in interpreting these results. First, “simply holding a referendum
on European integration does not necessarily increase” support for European integration
(ibidem: 606). Second, as suggested above, it is likely that voting behaviour is shaped not
only by the issue at stake but also, more or less, by other issues. Third, quantitative
designs assume that the votes are made under complete information.
 Foremost, although it seems counter-intuitive, “the greater the citizens’ pride in and
attachment to their nation, the greater is their support for European integration” (Hooghe
and Marks 2003: 19) and therefore, the same authors conclude, “cautiously but
emphatically, that national attachment is not mutually exclusive with either European
attachment or support for European integration” (ibidem: 19, emphasis in the original). For
instance, like Spaniards, Belgians have multiple identities in the same time (Billiet,
Doutrelepont, and Vandekeere 2000). Thus, “even in an era in which perceptions of the
European Union as successful seemed to decline, the tendency to identify with both nation
and Europe increased” (Citrin and Sides forthcoming: 8-9). Yet, the content of a European
identity may vary profoundly across territorial contexts (Risse 2002). To sum up, “whether
one conceives of the relationship as embedded, nested, or enmeshed, there is broad
consensus that a strong sense of national identity is consistent with European identity and
support for European integration” (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 20).
REFERENDUM AS A TOOL FOR BUILDING EUROPEAN IDENTITY
Notwithstanding both the absence of referendum in Belgium and the opposite outcomes in
Luxembourg and The Netherlands, the analysis of the three case-studies suggests that three effects
generated by referendums can foster the emergence of a European identity. Although the three
effects are related and definitely reinforce one another, they still can be distinguished as a learning
process, a European public sphere, and the narrowing of the political gap.
A learning-process
In The Netherlands and Luxembourg, the campaign for the referendum gradually
generated a complex learning-process (Crum 2005: 3). This is important to note since in
November 2004 over three-quarters of the voters in the two countries had not personally
heard about the draft of the European Constitution or knew very little about its contents. In
Belgium, it was the case for nine-tenths of the respondents. 22  For this reason, Leduc
maintains that in a referendum the campaign matters much more than in ordinary
elections (2005: 5). Thus, the question arises of the level of knowledge of the voters: “one
of the criticisms often leveled against the use of referendums is that ordinary citizens lack
sufficient knowledge to vote on complex policy issues” (Hobolt 2006: 156). On the other
hand, the organization of a public consultation can contribute to increasing the level of
knowledge via the information offered by the media as well as by the political leaders. 23
Above all, this learning-process is not only one-way: from those who have the knowledge
to those who don’t. A referendum offers the opportunity for a broad and public deliberation:
before, during, and after the actual voting day, regardless of the outcome. Such a
deliberation brings to the agenda important issues related to the question of the
referendum itself. Indeed, during both Dutch and Luxembourgish campaigns, the debates
focused not only on the content of the Constitution but also on European integration (as
well as on non-European issues). The benefits and the costs of the EU were discussed;
the question of future enlargement was also part of the debate. And even if, in the short
term, the voters cannot expect to renegotiate every compromise brokered between the
twenty-five member-states, a public deliberation has the potential to bring about, in the
long run at least, a process of Europeanization which would resonate more among the
populations, and therefore, they could identify –more– with the process.
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Finally, in Belgium, although no referendum was conducted, a learning process did occur.
Indeed, the announcements that a referendum would be held on the constitutional treaty in
France and in The Netherlands triggered a learning process in Belgium. For instance,
before the referendum the public radio organized debates between supporters and
opponents to the Constitution. Newspapers discussed in length the content, as well as the
arguments for and against the constitutional text. (Web)blogs were also created for the
occasion: quite a few journalists –sometimes based in Paris– reported on a daily basis the
evolution of the campaign, commented on the text, and gave their opinions. 24  Most of
these blogs also provided forums where (blog)readers could express their views. After the
referendum, the media tried to explain what the results meant and what was going to
happen for the EU. This trans-national attention reflects the development of a European
public sphere to which I turn now.
A European public sphere
This effect resembles and diverges from the first effect –the learning process. The
emergence of a European public sphere resembles the learning process because it occurs
not only in the country where the referendum is conducted but also in the neighboring
states. It diverges because many more issues than the learning process are discussed in
the burgeoning European public sphere. Moreover, a referendum alone does not generate
a trans-national public sphere, but it can contribute to the development of such a European
public sphere. Nonetheless, this so-called public sphere is fragmented rather than united,
plural rather than unique. Neighboring and similar countries, such as Belgium,
Luxembourg, and The Netherlands, are more likely to share a public sphere. Furthermore,
the public sphere is not frozen once and for all and public spheres overlap one another.
Van Gunsteren argues that the Dutch “No” vote has the potential to foster the development
of a European identity. The Dutch referendum (similar to the French referendum) and
more precisely its outcome have made plainly visible the growing existence of a European
public space: the “No” of the Dutch voters “resounded in a European public space. The
reactions of the authorities in Brussels –the ratification process must continue– were
broadcast on television in many European countries. International journalists sped towards
the Netherlands and reported about anxiety, emotions, and gut feelings. Such a European
public space did not really exist before, or only in a very limited sense. It was the domain of
professionals and Europeans, not of the citizens. … In acting by way of referendum, voters
have finally created a really European public space, without which European democracy
and citizenship could never materialize” (Van Gunsteren 2005: 407).
Although no referendum was to be conducted in their country, Belgians followed both
French and Dutch campaigns (however, for linguistic reasons, Francophone Belgians paid
more attention to France, and Flemish Belgians focused mainly on the Dutch campaign).
Francophone and Flemish media echoed the French and Dutch constitutional debate.
These developments can be seen “as intimating both the need for and the possibility of a
new public sphere: an agora for our day that both compromises and transforms the public
spheres of existing states so as to provide communicative direction to a new
Eurodemocracy” (Cohen and Sabel 2003: 360). 25  In these new developments,
television, more than any forms of media, plays a crucial role. Television programs reach a
large audience and cable television (which is very widespread in Belgium and
Luxembourg) 26  offers national channels as well as foreign channels. What’s more, in
addition to the national channels Francophone and Flemish Belgians watch respectively
French and Dutch channels, while Luxembourgers watch German and Belgian programs.
To sum up, the emergence of a European identity is likely to follow the burgeoning of a
European public sphere, at least in closely-related countries such as Belgium,
Luxembourg, and The Netherlands. Holding a referendum on a common issue can spark
–or reinforce– the development of such a European public sphere.
The narrowing of the political gap
Both Dutch and Luxembourgish referendum signaled the end of the permissive consensus
on the European integration –which was the business of the elites but not of the citizens
who trusted the former to take good care of it. They also blatantly revealed –although there
were signs of it before– the gap between the political class and the ordinary citizens. In
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The Netherlands particularly, the rejection of the treaty took place in a context of political
disenchantment (Crum 2005; Van Gunsteren 2005). Above all, it seems that there is a
democratic deficit both at the national and the EU level. As of the latter level, European
citizens feel that the EU lacks democracy, indeed. Representation at the EU level is in fact
very different from what is known at the national level. In fact, only the Members of the
European Parliament (E.P.) are directly elected though in second-order elections (very low
turn-over) and they are seen as second-order politicians. Ministers sitting in the Councils
are not elected in first place as “European” ministers but above all as national ministers
and therefore on national (and not European) issues.
This said, some scholars argued that representative democracy is not the only form of
democracy. Vivien Schmidt contends that “as such, the E.U. level taken on its own is not
democratic in the sense of governance by and of the people, although it can be
democratically legitimated in other ways, by its combination of governance with the people
through semi-pluralistic policymaking processes and governance for the people through its
quasi-federal institutional structures” (Schmidt 2006: 1; emphasis in the original). In this
perspective, Stijn Smisman sees a European civil society (which regroups not only
traditional interest groups, but also non-governmental organizations, associations from
several levels –neighborhood, city, region, state– and communities) acting as governance
with the people (Smisman 2003). Associative democracy seems to be better fitted to the
European context than classic representative democracy.
In this perspective, instruments of direct democracy (namely referendums, regardless of
their binding effects or not; or if they are required or not) can play an important role in
narrowing the gap between the political elite and the voters, and thus set the stage for a
governance with the people. Mayer and Palmowski add that “it has become commonplace
to assert the disjuncture presented by the accelerated drive for integration and the
manifest absence of a popular European ‘will’, but in essence this is a question of identity”
(2004: 574). Thus, before dealing with hard issues (such as taxation, or social and
economic policies), soft issues (such as the democratic deficit) need to be resolved.
Policies can at most create and sustain the conditions under which a European identity
may emerge. Such an identity can only become a reality through the actions of citizens
themselves. Referendums on European integration constitute such a condition for
European identity to emerge. Herman Van Gunsteren concludes that “the citizens have
seized this opportunity and acted. Thus, they have in one move realized European
citizenship and a real European public/political space” (Van Gunsteren 2005: 411).
In short, referendums not only shed light on the gap between the political elites and the
voters but also have the potential to narrow it by integrating the citizens in the decision
about the content, the direction, and the speed of the European enterprise, at least
partially and in combination with the two other effects. By so doing, the process of
Europeanization resonates more among Europeans and hence, increasing their
identification with it.
Pitfalls
A paradox accompanies necessarily the implementation of direct democracy on European
integration. While referendums can contribute to the emergence of a European identity,
Europeans may ultimately reject the process with which they start to identify. It is worth
reflecting on this paradox. First, by definition, direct democracy bears the potential to bring
a “positive” or a “negative” outcome –whose meaning may vary from one person to the
other and from one issue to the other. In any case, this outcome would be democratic,
even though the voters might have actually not voted on the specific issue. A second
comment logically follows: referendums must be practically organized as to minimize
second-order effects (i.e. that referendum be an opinion poll on the work of the
government or on the state of the economy). In the case of the European integration, this
is particularly crucial since the outcome of a negative vote seems not to matter much (i.e.
voters feel they have a freebie). Thus, the wording of the question should be precise,
clear, and specific (as to yield a yes or no answer). Third, the turnout for EU elections
being very low, referendums on a European issue may draw very few voters, too. 27
Therefore, in the absence of laws, the government should a priori set the conditions
(minimum turnout rate as well as the minimum percentage of positive votes) under which it
will follow the outcome of the referendum. 28  Fourth, referendums, which differ widely
from ordinary elections, have some particular characteristics : highly volatile electorate with
dramatic change during the campaign, highly uncertain outcomes, context and timing are
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important, risk of second order effects, and the political advantage rests with the “No”
camp (Leduc 2005: 12).
Mark Leonard, who strongly advocates the use of referendums, provides a “democratic
functionalist” solution to the paradox of referendums. After a moratorium on new treaties
–during which the EU should focus on the vrais problèmes des gens, citizens should be
included in the Europeanization process. Since they might disagree on how to integrate
more, the EU will transform progressively into a multiple EU. On the common background
of the 800,000 page acquis communautaire, a few willing members could further the
integration by way of coopération rapprochée (as it was the case for the Schengen
agreement or the Euro-zone). Finally, the new treaties (after the moratorium) should be
narrower (thus, it is easier to hold referendum on the issue) and the referendums should
be coordinated in order to avoid to end the series of referendums with Euro-skeptic
countries. 29  Nonetheless, using extensively a differentiated integration will eventually
lead to a multiple EU and therefore, to the loss of the essence of the European
construction.
CONCLUSIONS
Since its very beginning, Belgians, Luxembourgers, and Dutch have shared a strong
support for the European integration. Nonetheless, after fifty years of Europeanization,
they still don’t share a common European identity. The inexistence of a widely shared
common European identity started the reflection of this paper. Moreover, these three
similar countries diverged drastically on the issue of the European Constitution. Whereas
Belgium did not hold any referendum on the constitutional treaty, both Luxembourg and
The Netherlands conducted their first public consultation on a European issue, albeit with
an opposite outcome. On this background, I raised the question whether referendums
could contribute to the emergence of a European identity.
The exploration of the three case-studies suggests a positive –but cautious– answer.
Three positive effects have been identified. Referendums can trigger a learning process,
the emergence –or reinforcement– of a European public sphere, and the narrowing of the
political gap between the elites and the ordinary citizens: the combination of these effects
could lead to the emergence of a European identity –or European spirit, in order to stress
the difference from national identities. Nevertheless, holding referendums on European
integration can paradoxically lead to stop the process of integration. Indeed, in the case of
the development of a European identity, while referendums can contribute to the
emergence of such an identity, Europeans can ultimately reject the process with which
they start to identify. To this paradox, there is no perfect solution. However, the practical
organization of referendums can contribute to minimize second-orders effects. The
wording should be specific and clear; the timing should be thought of.
Above all, last year’s referendum was a total novelty for both Dutch and Luxembourgers.
The exercise of direct democracy has to be learnt, especially in the case of European
integration where voters feel that they have a freebie since Europe seems not to matter.
The development of a collective, in this case European, identity is a long process.
Referendums do in fact contribute to the emergence of such a collective identity. Yet,
referendums are neither the only instruments nor the solution to the problem of
participation at the EU level. To conclude this paper, I elaborate briefly on two other forms
of public participation at the EU level: EU-wide referendums and European conventions.
EU-wide referendums, like national referendums on European integration, have the
potential to foster a European identity. Such referendums would trigger the three effects
discussed in the essay; and probably in a more striking fashion since all Europeans would
be part of the process. One can easily imagine the impact on the development of a
European public sphere. Nevertheless, EU-wide referendums would face the same pitfalls
as national referendums (even perhaps in a more dramatic fashion). What’s more, the
very idea of conducting EU-wide referendums is likely to be fought harshly for such
referendums would give to much weight to big countries or they would be practically
difficult to be held, let alone the absence of political will.
European conventions, reproductions grandeur nature of the constitutional convention,
could be organized on European issues. There –it might also be virtual conventions,
European citizens could gather and discuss thoroughly, in the same fashion the members
of the convention did, European questions. These conventions could pave the way for the
formation of a Habermasian “constitutional patriotism.” A European identity could emerge
from these European gatherings and working-together-for-the-common-good events.
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However, the practical organization of such gatherings may bare this theoretical
suggestion to ever become reality.
May 2006
APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Support to country’s membership to the European
Community/Union: 1973-2004.
Question: “Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the
European Community (Common Market) is ...?”
Source: Eurobarometer Interactive Search System,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm, accessed April 1, 2006.
Country: Belgium Period: From September 1973 (EB1) To April 2004 (EB61)
Country: Luxembourg Period: From September 1973 (EB1) To April 2004 (EB61)
Country: The Netherlands Period: From September 1973 (EB1) To April 2004 (EB61)
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Appendix 2: National identity and European identity: 1992-2004.
Question: In the near future do you see yourself as...?
Source: Eurobarometer Interactive Search System,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm, accessed April 1, 2006.
Country: Belgium Period: From April 1992 (EB37.0) To April 2004 (EB61)
Country: Luxembourg Period: From April 1992 (EB37.0) To April 2004 (EB61)
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Country: The Netherlands Period: From April 1992 (EB37.0) To April 2004 (EB61)
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Notes de base de page numériques:
1 Paper prepared for presentation in the seminar Social Europe (IR551), Pr. Vivien A. Schmidt, Boston
University, Spring 2006. The author was at the time a fellow of the Belgian American Educational
Foundation (B.A.E.F.) and a Fellow of the Francqui Foundation.
2 On May 29, 2005, French voters rejected the constitutional treaty with 54.7% in favor of the “No.”
3 I use the term referendum to designate all kind of referendums and consultations (binding and
non-binding; required, non-required active and non-required passive).
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4 France could have been included in this study. However, it was excluded for several reasons : the three
BeNeLux countries forms a more or less homogenous set, they are considered as “small countries” in
European terms and as “low countries” in the political science jargon, they have usually shared a federal
vision of the European integration, and European referendums constitute a new experience.
5 Benededict Anderson refers to nation as imagined communities: “imagined as both inherently limited
and sovereign. […] It is imagined because members […] will never know most of their fellow-members […],
yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. It is limited because […] the nation has finite,
if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. […] It is sovereign because it came to maturity at a
stage of human history when freedom was a rare and precious ideal. […] Finally, it is imagined as a
community because […] it is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1983: 5-7).
6 The founders of the European Union hoped to deepen European identity as a by-product of integration
that could be led by elites with the implicit consent of publics (Marks and Hooghe 2003: 29). Likewise,
Jolyon Howorth argues that the E.U. is characterized by its doing; however, it lacks a being. Therefore, the
Europeans do not share a political culture which is the harmonization between being and doing. The
question is, then, “could Europe ever become a place of being, a place of identity?” Howorth suggests that
“units of human collectiveness which begin life naturally as units of doing, normally evolve into units of
being, and hence of identity,” yet he acknowledges, unlike at the E.U. level, at the national level, the state
played a chief role in the development of the nation-sate identity (Howorth 2000: 93).
7 For instance, notwithstanding the cost and the practical impact, any official language of a country
becomes an official language of the EU
8 This view of a European spirit fits David Laitin’s 2?1 cultural configuration, which is consolidating itself in
Europe (Laitin 2002). On top of their national culture, Europeans embrace a more or less common European
culture and sometimes, they can also embrace a regional culture. As of languages for instance, in addition
to English (an all-European lingua franca), each state conserves its own language. Moreover, in some
regions, private -and sometimes public- life is operated in a third language (Catalan in the North-East of
Spain, or Russian in Latvia).
9 In Denmark, Ireland, and Norway (1972); in the United Kingdom (1975); in Austria, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden (1994); in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia,
Slovenia (2003).
10 In Denmark (1986) and Ireland (1987) for the Single European Act ; in Denmark, France, Ireland
(1992) and in Denmark again (1993) for the Maastricht Treaty ; in Denmark and Ireland (1998) for the
Amsterdam Treaty ; in France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Spain (2005) for the European
Constitution.
11 In France (1972) on the enlargement of the European Community ; in Italy on the mandates for
members of the European parliament (1989); in Liechtenstein and Switzerland on the European Economic
Area treaty (1992); in Denmark  (2000) and Sweden (2003) on the European currency.  
12 This figure is correct as of April 2006 and excludes referendum in Greenland, the principality of
Liechtenstein and the Åland Islands (Finland).
13 Interestingly, the special Eurobarometer 199 “Citizenship and Sense of Belonging” reports that with
62% of Belgians supporting the statement “Citizens should participate more actively in politics in our
country” Belgium has the lower score amongst EU-15 countries (Greece and Sweden with respectively 89%
and 85% have the higher percentage)(2004: 26). However, it’s impossible to know what citizens
understand by “participate more actively in politics.”
14 The Constitution was first modified in 1997 in order to allow the possibility for local consultative
referendums, and then in 1998 to extent the possibility to the provincial level.
15 In Autumn 2005, on the one hand, 78% of Belgians thought a European Constitution was necessary to
ensure that the European institutions work well but on the other hand, a majority suggested that the
Constitution should be renegotiated (60%)(Eurobarometer 64, Executive Report, Belgium, 2005: 2-7).
16 The Federal Parliament (Chamber and Senate) and the Assemblies of both Communities and Regions
approved the treaty (April 2005-February 2006).
17 Under Luxembourgese law, voting is compulsory, which explains
18 In 1903, the Parliament discussed the possibility of introducing referendums in the Dutch polity (Rigo
2005: 3).
19 The topics of opinion change, the campaign, the electorate and turnout, the
vote decision, and the results have been discussed elsewhere (see, e.g., LeDuc
2005).
20 With the exception of Ireland, and the partial exception of Austria and Denmark, referendums on
European integration have taken place at the discretion of governments.  Most of the new constitutions in
Central and Eastern Europe also contain provisions for referendums.
21 See ILRES web site, http://www.tns-ilres.com/tnsi%2Dcms/Web/Home/, accessed April 19, 2006.
22 Special Eurobarometer 214 “The Future Constitutional Treaty” (2005).
23 Hobolt observes that “while voters have very little knowledge on the specific
ballot proposal, they can still make informed choices by relying on heuristic
shortcuts, such as elite endorsements and campaign cues” (Hobolt 2006: 156).
24 For example, the blog by journalists at La Libre Belgique: http://parislibre.blogs.lalibre.be/, accessed
on April 14, 2006 or by journalists at De Standaard: http://standaard.typepad.com/dso/, accessed on April
14, 2006.
25 For background, see Jürgen Habermas’s influential writing about the public sphere (Habermas 1989)
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and for a more recent application to the EU (see Habermas 1996).
26 See the statistics for Belgium at: http://www.statbel.fgov.be/figures/d75_fr.asp#14, accessed on April
22, 2006.
27 In Luxembourg (even in the case of referendums) and Belgium, voting is compulsory and since 1979
the turnout is more or less 90%. In The Netherlands, it was 39.3% for the elections of 2004 and 62.8% for
the referendum.
28 For instance, the Dutch government set the two following conditions: a turn-out superior to 30% and
an unambiguous outcome (i.e. either 60% in favor of the “Yes” or 60% in favor of the “No”).
29 Mark Leonard, “Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century?,” Boston University, March 14, 2005.
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